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Abstract We show how any party can encrypt data for an e-passport
holder such that only with physical possession of the e-passport decryp-
tion is possible. The same is possible for electronic identity cards and
driver licenses. We also indicate possible applications. Dutch passports
allow for 160 bit security, theoretically giving sufficient security beyond
the year 2079, exceeding current good practice of 128 bit security. We
also introduce the notion of RDE Extraction PIN which effectively can
provide the same security as a regular PIN. Our results ironically suggest
that carrying a passport when traveling abroad might violate export or
import laws on strong cryptography.
Keywords: e-passport, electronic driver license, encryption, chip au-
thentication, identity card
1 Introduction
Dutch citizens can access electronic government services through DigiD, a cent-
ral authentication system. Citizens are redirected by the government service
to DigiD where authentication takes place. If this is successful, the user dir-
ected back to the government service. Current DigiD is based on a knowledge
authentication factor only (userid/password). In 2016 a pilot was concluded sup-
plementing DigiD with a possession factor. This factor consists of a contactless
electronic identity document of the user. The user first authenticates to DigiD
using userid/password and then lets DigiD remotely read his identity document
whereby proving possession. This setup is called Remote Travel Document Au-
thentication [12,23]. As the setup is also applicable to other types of documents
we refer to Remote Document Authentication (RDA). Compare Section 2. For
simplicity of exposition, we only refer to electronic passports (e-passports) com-
pliant with international specifications [5]. Other identity document types are
discussed in Section 5.
⋆ Work done for the Dutch Vehicle Authority (RDW) on which a patent application
has been filed.
1. INTRODUCTION
In RDA one effectively uses an e-passport as a PKI smartcard to authentic-
ate its holder to an external party. Typically PKI smartcards also contain an
encryption certificate allowing external parties to encrypt data for the user. Gert
Maneschijn posed the question if a similar functionality could be provided by an
e-passport. In other words: can an external party extract a public key from an
e-passport allowing data encryption that can only be decrypted by the holder?
We refer to this ability as Remote Document Encryption (RDE). Note that we
require that RDE is based on existing e-passport protocols. The feasibility of
RDE is not only academically interesting but also practically. We discuss four
practically relevant use cases but we think many more exist:
Secure Messagebox Governments are replacing paper letters with electronic
messages made available to the user through a central facility. This facility is
a hotspot, i.e. an accumulation of user personal data. RDE allows compart-
mentalization where various governmental organizations use user e-passports
to encrypt data. In this way the central facility is no longer a hotspot.
Medical Portal Compartmentalization Health care providers are giving pa-
tients electronic access to their medical records. For convenience medical
portals are used allowing to perform both non-sensitive (e.g. making appoint-
ments) as sensitive functions (access to medical records). Typically access is
given to medical records of all departments the patient has consulted within
the health care provider. RDE allows portal compartmentalization.
Secure data storage on NFC devices It is not good practice to locally store
sensitive data in mobile applications (APPs) as these could compromise when
the device is lost. This means sensitive data can only reside at server side
and needs to be recollected when required. This can result in slow perceived
APPs . The mobile data usage can also be costly. With RDE one can locally
secure data. This is particularity interesting for Near Field Communication
(NFC) enabled devices where e-passports can be directly read.
Cloud encryption A natural extension to the previous use case is to let a user
connect a contactless card reader to a PC. The user can then RDE encrypt
all its sensitive data and place it in the cloud. Only with the e-passport the
data is decipherable again. In this setting users only need to (physically)
protect their e-passport and no longer worry about cloud security.
Gert Maneschijn’s idea was to base RDE on the e-passport AA protocol on which
RDA is also based. That is, the AA public key would play the role of the RDE
public key. Specifically, if AA would be based on text-book RSA [13] one could
base RDE on ‘forged’ signatures. Here a party can generate challenges enabling
prediction of the signature. The data would then be encrypted with the signature
and the encrypted data would accompanied with the challenge. The e-passport
holder would then be able to calculate the signature based on the challenge and
decrypt the data. However, AA is not based on text-book RSA but is based on
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Digital Signature scheme 1 [9]. Here the AA challenge is hashed
by the e-passport and concatenated with a large random number generated by
the document. This means it is not possible to predict signatures. Actually,
many countries are no longer using AA based on RSA signature schemes but
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are replacing this with Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based signatures,
i.e. EC-DSA [18]. Here signature forgery is also precluded.
Outline of the paper
In this paper we show how RDE can be based on the Chip Authentication
protocol. Basic e-passport protocols and RDA are first discussed in Section 2. In
Section 3 we first present an RDE implementation metaphor and then discuss the
Chip Authentication protocol on which RDE will be based. RDE will be specified
in Section 4. In Section 5 we further discuss RDE including some variations and
extensions to identity cards and electronic driver licenses and Section 6 contains
conclusions. Finally, in the appendix we provide results of our RDE experiments
based on an e-passport simulator, a Dutch e-passport and a Dutch identity card.
2 Basic e-passport protocols and RDA
Like most card protocols, e-passport protocols distinguish the card and a party
wanting to read data from it, usually called the terminal. The terminal sends
commands including parameters to the card called application protocol data
units or APDUs to which the card responses and whereby certain states inside
the card can change. Compare [8]. RDA [12] is based on three basic e-passport
protocols BAC, PA and AA [7] we now briefly explain. All personal data prin-
ted on an e-passport is also electronically available. By the contactless nature
of e-passports it needs to be avoided that this data can be surreptitiously read.
To this end, access to the e-passport data is protected by Basic Access Control
(BAC). In essence, the terminal needs to prove knowledge of a password. This
BAC password takes the form of a so-called Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) a
long string printed on the e-passport. As the name indicates, the MRZ is typically
scanned by a computer facilitating electronic reading of electronic e-passports,
e.g. in border control. Actually, only parts of the MRZ are actually used as a
password, namely: the document number, the expiry date of the document and
the date of birth of the holder. In BAC the e-passport generates a random num-
ber that needs to be encrypted by the terminal with a cryptographic key derived
from the MRZ. Only when this encryption is correct, the e-passport will give
the terminal access to its data. Actually, the BAC protocol not only ensures
access control but also provides secure messaging protecting the communication
against eavesdropping. This allows the terminal to protect the commands in-
cluding the parameters and the responses. This secure messaging is based on
two cryptographic keys, one for confidentiality and one for authenticity. These
keys are based on the MRZ and random numbers generated by the card and
the reader. With these keys, the terminal encrypts the command (APDU) and
parameters, calculates a message authentication code on the result and wrapped
these in a secure messaging object. The card does a similar thing with the re-
sponse. In [7, Appendix D-4] an worked out example of this is provided which
is very illustrative. From now on we will refer to the protected command and
protected response in this context.
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Data on an e-passport takes the form of (elementary) files on the document
called data groups. These data groups are both individually and collectively
signed by the government that issued the document. This is called Passive Au-
thentication (PA). For PA an e-passport contains a file called the Document
Security Object, also known as EF.SOD. The document security object contains
a digital signature of the issuer and the public part of the key that was used.
This public key is wrapped in a certificate issued from a published government
Public Key Infrastructure. The signature is placed on the concatenation of the
hashes of all data groups. Validation of a data group comprises of checking the
concatenated hashes signature and checking that the hash of the data group is
present in the document security object.
With PA one cannot only validate the authenticity of an individual data
group but also that all data groups correspond to the same e-passport. As these
data groups and signatures can be copied, e-passports can also prove their au-
thenticity. This is called Active Authentication and works as follows. One data
group (data group 15) contains an Active Authentication public key. The cor-
responding private key is securely placed in the e-passport. A party reading the
e-passport can validate is authenticity by generating a (8 byte) random number
and letting this be signed by the e-passport with its AA private key. The party
can validate the signature and the authenticity of the public key through PA.
In Protocol 1 we have given a basic description of RDA [12] of which many
variants exist. The interlinking between the various steps is typically based on
the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) protocol [22]. Clearly, if the
userid/password authentication in Step 3 fails one typically would allow the
user to re-enter the userid/password for a limited number of times. The MRZ
in Step 4 does not need to be provided to DigiD at each authentication but
could be stored by DigiD, e.g. as part of a registration process. If Step 5 is
successful the commands including parameters and responses in Steps 6 and 9
are protected. One can also use another protocol controlling access to the e-
passport in Step 5. This protocol is called Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment (PACE)[7]. In essence, PACE is based on the establishment of a
secure messaging tunnel based on an (anonymous) Diffie-Hellman key exchange
based on the MRZ data. If a reader does not use the correct MRZ data, the
tunnel will not be established and the e-passport data cannot be read. PACE
is more secure than BAC as it is more resistant to MRZ brute-forcing. In Step
9 of the RDA protocol one can also incorporate a message, e.g. by letting the
random number be based as the hash of a message and a random number. In this
way, unrefutable proof exists that the user, or rather its e-passport, was present
during the authentication and consented to the message. Actually, this property
is the reason that German e-passports do not support the AA protocol as it
could be abused. Compare [7, Appendix C]. Alternatively, one can use the Chip
Authentication (CA) protocol which, similar to the PACE protocol, is based on
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. With the CA protocol the reader can
validate the authenticity of the e-passport but in a non-transferable way. That
is, a transcript of a CA execution cannot be used to other people as a proof that
4
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Protocol 1 Remote Documentation Authentication
1: A service provider requests a user to authenticate.
2: The user is redirected to DigiD.
3: The user authenticates at DigiD with userid/password. If
authentication is unsuccessful RDA fails.
4: The user allows DigiD access to its e-passport through middleware,
i.e. the e-passport application is selected.
5: The user allows DigiD to read his e-passport by giving the MRZ. If
unsuccessful RDA fails, otherwise secure messaging is established.
6: DigiD reads data group 1 (Identity Information), data group 15 (AA
public key) and the Document Security Object (EF.SOD).
7: DigiD validates the authenticity of the data groups read and that they
belong to each other (PA). If unsuccessful, RDA fails.
8: If the identification data from steps 3 and 6 do not match, RDA fails.
9: DigiD generates a random number and lets the e-passport sign this with
its AA private key (AA).
10: DigiD validates the signature. If this is incorrect, RDA fails.
11: RDA is successful and the user is redirected to service provider
accompanied with relevant personal data, e.g. the BSN.
the user’s e-passport was present. This is due to the property that anyone can
construct such CA transcripts. Actually the CA protocol has an even stronger
property which forms the basis for our Remote Document Encryption setup as
we show in the next section.
3 RDE through chip authentication
Consider two people, Alice and Bob, having regular conversations. Alice knows
Bob so well, that she knows at forehand the responses of Bob of any statement
she makes. Alice can then encrypt messages for Bob as follows (cf. Figure 1):
1. Alice generates a random statement and predicts the response of Bob.
2. Alice uses the response as a key to encrypt a message for Bob.
3. Alice sends the encrypted message to Bob plus her statement.
On receipt of the encrypted message and Alice’s statement, Bob can then decrypt
the message as follows:
1. Bob forms its response to the statement of Alice.
2. Bob uses the response to decrypt the encrypted message.
To make this setup secure, it is vital that only Alice can predict Bob’s responses.
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Figure 1: RDE metaphor
As in the metaphor, we let a party use a predicted response of the holder’s
e-passport as an encryption key for a message. To make the responses only
predictable for the party (and the user) we base RDE on the secure messaging
mechanisms of e-passports. Information between an e-passport and a reader is
exchanged radiographically and secure messaging protects against attacks like
eavesdropping. More in particular, secure messaging protects the confidentiality
and authenticity of exchanged information. Within the context of e-passports
three types of secure messaging exist: BAC, PACE, and CA. As as indicated in
Figure 2, CA and its secure messaging can only be established after a successful
execution of either the BAC or PACE protocol. After a successful execution
of the CA protocol, BAC/PACE secure messaging is replaced by CA secure
messaging. Moreover, the establishment of CA secure messaging is independent
of the BAC/PACE tunnel. In other words, for the description of CA messaging
we effectively do not have to consider BAC/PAC. For completeness we have also
mentioned the Terminal Authentication (TA) protocol. With this protocol, the
terminal can prove its authenticity to the e-passport similar to the AA protocol.
This is required before sensitive data groups (biometrics) can be read. TA is
mentioned as “Extended Access Control to Additional Biometrics” in the ICAO
specification [7] but is not further specified. In practice, the TA protocol specified
in [1] is used. TA retains secure messaging from CA, i.e. does not introduce
additional secure messaging.
Figure 2: e-passport secure messaging
The CA protocol works as follows. Similar to the AA setup the CA setup also
contains a public key stored in an e-passport data group (data group 14, cf. [7]).
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This data group is also signed by the publisher through passive authentication.
The CA private key is securely stored in the document chip. In contrast to the
AA setup, the CA public key is not a digital signature key but a so-called Diffie-
Hellman key, cf. [13]. The CA protocol is based on an additive group (〈G〉,+) of
order q generated by an element G; these are called domain parameters. The CA
public key Y on an e-passport takes the form xG where x ∈R (0, q) is the CA
private key. We use additive notation as this is customary in the context of elliptic
curve groups which are now commonly used in CA. As an illustration, all active
Dutch passports (and identity cards) are equipped with an elliptic curve CA key.
Prior to 9 March 2014, Dutch passports used the 256 bit brainpoolP256r1 curve
and after this date the 320 bit brainpoolP320r1 curve is used.
Data group 14 also contains the symmetric cryptographic algorithms suppor-
ted in CA secure messaging. This encompasses an encryption algorithm and a
message authentication (cryptographic checksum) algorithm. Secure messaging
is based on encrypt-then-authenticate mode, i.e. data is padded, encrypted and
afterwards the formatted encrypted data is input to the authentication calcula-
tion. Currently, cf. [7], four combinations are specified:
id-CA-DH-3DES-CBC-CBC This uses two key 3DES [15] in Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode for both encryption and authentication (112 bit se-
curity).
id-CA-DH-AES-CBC-CMAC-128 This uses 128 bit AES [17] in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode for encryption and in CMAC mode for au-
thentication (128 bit security).
id-CA-DH-AES-CBC-CMAC-192 This uses 192 bit AES [17] in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode for encryption and in CMAC mode for au-
thentication (192 bit security).
id-CA-DH-AES-CBC-CMAC-256 This uses 256 bit AES [17] in Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) mode for encryption and in CMAC mode for au-
thentication (256 bit security).
Although in principle an e-passport might support multiple algorithms, in prac-
tice an e-passport only supports one. In Protocol 2 we have given a description
based on [7] of how a party (terminal) can run the CA protocol. The terminal
can only conclude a CA execution is successful, if it successfully read a file on
the document over the established secure messaging. This is why the protocol 2
also contains a file identifier FId and a (non-zero) number of bytes to be read.
There exist two methods to read a file on an e-passport (cf. [6, Section 3.9.3]): by
selecting the file and then reading the data, or by reading the data directly using
a so-called short file identifier. The first method uses two commands. Compare
[8]. The second and recommended method only uses one such command called
READ BINARY (RB) on which we have based Protocol 2 on.
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Protocol 2 CA protocol and reading n bytes from file FId with command RB.
[We assume the terminal has successfully setup a BAC/PACE channel.]
1: The terminal reads data group 14 (CA public key Y , domain parameters
and encryption algorithms to use) from the e-passport.
2: The terminal validates the authenticity of the data group through
passive authentication. If this fails, CA fails.
3: The terminal generates an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key pair, i.e.
generates a (pseudo) random number k ∈ (0, q) and forms the ephemeral
public key Z = kG. This is sent to the e-passport.
4: Both parties compute the shared Diffie-Hellman secret K. The card
calculates this as K = xZ, the terminal as K = kY . Both parties
derive two session keys KSEnc and KSMAC from their view of K.
5: On these keys, CA secure messaging will be based, encryption is based
on key KSEnc and authentication on key KSMAC.
6: The terminal sends the protected command RB to read n bytes from
file FId resulting in a protected response M¯, i.e. ciphertext.
7: If cryptographic processing (authentication validation, decryption) on
M¯ fails, CA fails otherwise CA is successfully executed.
Successful secure messaging (Steps 6,7) is a guarantee that the two views of
K in Step 4 coincide and that the e-passport is authentic. In normal practice a
terminal application never uses the protected M¯ but will see the actual plaintext
bytes read from the file and a successful return status. The following proposition
is the basis for the working of our RDE implementation; we let |q| denote the
size in bits of the CA group order.
Proposition 3.1 The protected messages RB and M¯ in Step 6 of Protocol 2
are deterministically based on the ephemeral key Z from Step 3, the file FId read
and the actual contents read. That is, if the terminal executes Protocol 2 twice
with the same ephemeral key Z and the same parameters (n, FId), then RB and
M¯ would also be the same.
Proof: We only discuss M¯ as results on RB follow similarly. The proof of the
first part of the proposition follows from an analysis of the CA secure messaging
setup in [7]. If follows from [7, Section 9.7] that the derived keys KSEnc and
KSMAC are deterministically based on K only. Moreover, K is deterministically
based on the ephemeral key Z and the private CA key of the e-passport. Secure
messages either contain commands from the terminal to the card, or responses
from the card. It follows from [7, Section 9.8] that protected messages contain
an encrypted message and a “cryptographic checksum”. The message to be en-
crypted (card command or response) is first padded in a deterministic fashion
([10, “Padding Method 2”] ) and then encrypted with KSEnc. It follows that the
encrypted messages deterministically follow from the plain input (card command
or response) and KSEnc (and hence Z). If also follows from [7, Section 9.8] that
the cryptographic checksum is a message authentication code based on KSMAC
on the encrypted message and a so-called send sequence counter (SSC). This
SSC starts with value zero and is increased with each command and response.
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That is, the read command of Step 7 of Protocol 2, first uses SSC value 1 is
used and the card response uses SSC value 2 etcetera. It follows that the crypto-
graphic checksums also deterministically follows from K, the plain input (card
command or response) and SSC, i.e. the number of the protected message. 
The previous results implies that the protected response M¯ in Protocol 2 is
a function of n, FId and the (pseudo)random k, which we represent by M¯(., ., .).
That is, M¯ = M¯(n, FId, k). Similarly we specify a function RB(n, FId, k). We
remark that it is crucial that in CA messaging the send sequence counter (SSC)
starts with one and is not randomly set. The latter is the case in BAC messaging
when based on 3DES, cf. [7, Section 9.8.6.3]. As CA messaging completely re-
places BAC messaging this is of no consequence. In addition to the analysis
of the e-passport specification [7] we also successfully tested the first part of
Proposition 3.1 using the Smart Card Shell and the Smart Card Shell Script
Collection [3]. Our tests were based on the e-passport simulator in the collection
and on a Dutch e-passport. In the simulation the test was performed with 3DES
and 128 bit AES. The CA protocol of the Dutch e-passport was based on the
Brainpool320r1 curve and 256 bit AES secure messaging. In the appendix we
have provided results from the simulator tests. The following assumption is the
basis for the security of our RDE implementation.
Assumption 3.2 Let n, FId be fixed. Then the functions k → RB(n, FId, k) and
k → M¯(n, FId, k) are key derivation functions sensu [21] of security strength at
least MIN(128, |q|/2) bits for DES based secure messaging and MIN(192, |q|/2)
bits for AES.
Effectively this assumption states that the ICAO secure messaging mechan-
ism [7] is sound: to break the mechanism an attacker is forced to either find the
ephemeral Diffie-Hellman private key k or to brute force KSEnc and/or KSMAC.
Eavesdropping on communication between terminal and e-passport and partial
plaintext knowledge should not help an attacker effectively to extract plaintext
from new secure messages or in predicting them.
This assumption can be further quantified by inspecting the secure messaging
setup used in e-passports, cf. [7, Figure 5]. A protected message consists of at
least one full encryption block based on KSEnc and of a 64 bit message authen-
tication code over the encrypted payload based on KSMAC. It is reasonable to
assume that each such cryptogram behave as the output of a key derivation
function sensu [21] based on the encryption key used. Actually, [21] specifies key
derivation functions in such fashion. In case of DES based messaging the encryp-
tion block is of size 64 bits and in case of AES this is of size 128 bits. So the total
length is at least 128 bits in case of DES based messaging and at least 192 bits
in case of AES. Both encryptions keys KSEnc and KSMAC are derived from the
shared Diffie-Hellman key based on k . The final motivation for the assumption
is that the total security strength of the considered function is upper bounded
by the security strength of the CA protocol which is |q|/2 bits, cf. [13].
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4 RDE specification
Based on the discussions in Section 3 we can now specify Remote Document
Encryption. The idea is use the protected response M¯ from Protocol 2 , i.e.
a cryptogram, to derive an encryption key from. A party can compute M¯ by
simulation and the e-passport holder can use its passport. Compare Figure 3
from the appendix: the first rounds corresponds with the party and the second
round with the user.
RDE consists of three use cases: e-passport holder registration at a party,
data encryption by the party and decryption of the data by the holder using his
e-passport. These uses cases are specified in Protocols 3, 4 and 5 respectively.
These protocols are examples; some steps can be done in different order too. In
these protocols we introduce the notion RDE key extraction parameters. This is
a triple (n, FId, FCont) where the first two elements are from Protocol 2. We let
FId be a PA protected data group and we let FCont represent the full contents
of it. In practice it is convenient to let FId simply be data group 14, i.e. the data
group holding the CA public key.
Protocol 3 Remote Document Encryption registration
1: The e-passport holder authenticates to a party wanting to use RDE. If
authentication fails, RDE registration fails.
2: The e-passport provides the party with data group 1 (Identity
Information), data group 14 (CA public key and parameters) and the
Document Security Object (EF.SOD) from its e-passport.
3: The party validates consistency of the information given in Steps
1 and 2. The authenticity of the information provided in Step 2 is
validated through passive authentication. If either validation is
unsuccessful, RDE registration fails.
4: The holder and the party agree on RDE key extraction parameters
(n, FId, FCont). Here the party validates the authenticity of FCont
through passive authentication using EF.SOD from Step 2.
5: The holder gives his consent to the party for the usage of RDE to
encrypt (confidential) information. If consent is not given, RDE
registration fails.
6: The holder is registered at the party for the usage of RDE.
Certainly the first two steps of RDE registration could be based on, and in
fact combined with, RDA. As indicated earlier, for convenience one can let data
group 14 also take the role of file FId. We note that like all cards, e-passports
have certain restrictions on the size a command plus parameters and a response
can take. All e-passports support a standard size response of 255 bytes. With
secure messaging extra overhead is introduced limiting the effective data one can
read. Typically
In the next protocol we specify how the party can encrypt for the e-passport
holder with the registered data. Here H(.) represents a secure hash function, e.g.
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SHA-256 [16]. We let EK(.) represent an symmetric encryption operation, e.g.
AES [17].
Protocol 4 Remote Document Encryption of data D for e-passport holder H
1: The party looks up the CA public key of the holder and the RDE key
extraction method (n, FId, FCont).
2: The party generates a ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key pair and uses this
together with the CA public key to calculate session keys KSEnc and
KSMAC from CA secure messaging.
3: The party simulates reading the holder’s e-passport in line with
extraction method (n, FId, FCont) resulting in a protected READ BINARY
command RB and protected response M¯.
4: The party uses the protected response M¯ as the output of a key
derivation function, i.e. uses a secure hash value H(M¯) of M¯ to
encrypt data D, i.e. forms C = EH(M¯)(D).
5: The party provides the ephemeral public key Z, RB and C to the
holder.
In the next protocol we specify how the holder can decrypt the encrypted
data C by using his e-passport.
Protocol 5 Remote Document Decryption of Z,RB,C by e-passport holder H
1: The holder uses Z this together with his e-passport to start CA
secure messaging.
2: The holder sends the protected READ BINARY command RB to his
e-passport, resulting in protected response M¯.
3: The holder uses the secure hash value H(M¯) of M¯ to decrypt C.
RDE security follows from Assumption 3.2. That the protected READ BIN-
ARY command RB will not help an attacker to predict the protected response
M¯ , is closely related to soundness of ICAO secure messaging [7].
It is best to base EK(.) on an authenticated form of encryption, e.g. AES
based on CCM [19]. By doing so the holder has assurance the RDE decryption
process was conducted correctly. One can omit the second step (authentication)
in Protocol 3, but this introduces the risk that a fraudster uses a stolen e-passport
to register the holder and gets access to confidential information. This can be
mitigated by adding holder authentication in Step 5 of Protocol 4. In the Secure
Messagebox and Medical Portal Compartmentalization use cases from Section 1
one can have holder authentication in both Protocols 3 and 4.
We have experimented with RDE on an AES-256 based Dutch passport (is-
sued June 2015, based on Brainpool320r1/AES-256) and a Dutch identity card
(issued July 2010, based on Brainpool256r1/3DES). In the first case one achieves
160 bit security and in the second 128 bit, cf. Assumption 3.2. In both cases the
RDE decryption execution time on the e-passport/card was less than 2 seconds.
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5 Further discussions, extensions and variations
According to NIST [20], 128 bit security suffices beyond 2031. To estimate the
strength of 160 bit security achievable by e-passports we use Moore’s law. A
widely accepted interpretation of this law is that that the computing power
one gets for the same amount of money doubles every 18 months. This means
that 160 bit security would suffice beyond the year 2079 (=2031 + 32*1,5). Our
results ironically suggest that carrying a passport when traveling abroad might
violate export or import laws on cryptography. Compare [14].
In many countries, including the Netherlands, the national identity card is
also based on the ICAO specifications [5]. Most notably, the fifth part of these
specifications define smartcard sized (“TD1”) documents corresponding to typ-
ical identity cards. For such national identity cards, RDE is also available if
CA is supported. We successfully verified that a Dutch identity card (issued
in July 2010) conforms to Proposition 3.1. RDE can also be available on elec-
tronic driver licenses conformant to the European regulation 383/2012 of 4 May
2012 [4] and/or standard ISO/IEC 18013 [11] as both have adopted the ICAO
CA protocol. Electronic driver licenses are in use in the Netherlands since 14
November 2014. These support the BAC/AA protocol but not the CA protocol
implying that RDE is not possible on them. RDE seems not possible on the Ger-
man eID card (neue Personalausweis) [2]. A first reason for this is the switching
of the order of CA and TA execution(CA/TA version 2). A terminal first has to
successfully conclude the TAv2 protocol, i.e. has to be authenticated, before the
CAv1 protocol can start. A more fundamental issue is that unlike in e-passport
CA CAv2 secure messaging is based on a random number generated by the card.
This makes it impossible for a party to predict protected responses of the card.
In Protocol 2 we only use one protected READ BINARY to base an RDE
encryption key on. Alternatively, one could use a few of such commands and
base the encryption key on all secure responses. By using i read commands of,
for instance, the first i bytes of data group 14, the i-th security response would
contain a 64-bit authenticator also based on send sequence counter 2, 4, . . . ,
2 · i. In this way the encryption key closely resembles the NIST key derivation
function “KDF in Counter Mode” [21, Section 5.1]. Note that one would then
need i protected READ BINARY commands corresponding to send sequence
counter 1, 2, . . . , 2 · i − 1 To harvest this conceptual advantage, it typically
suffices to take i = 2.
We can easily supplement the RDE possession factor with a knowledge factor
by introduction of the notion of RDE “Extraction PIN” (or “Extraction Pass-
word”). This PIN is then agreed between the holder and the party wanting to
use RDE as part of of Step 4 of RDE registration, i.e. Protocol 3. The party
then uses this PIN to additionally encrypt the elements Z and/or RB in Step 5
of Protocol 4 in such a way that the PIN cannot be deduced from the encryp-
ted elements only, i.e. without the e-passport. As an illustration, simply AES
encrypting Z with the PIN would not be sound. Indeed, an attacker could find
the PIN by looking for a PIN that decrypts the ciphertext to an point in 〈G〉.
A simple and effective way to do this is to deterministically map the PIN in the
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group 〈G〉 used in the Chip Authentication protocol and then add the embedded
PIN to Z. That is, all parties agree upon an embedding I : {0, 1}∗ → 〈G〉 and the
encrypting party sends Z ′ = I(PIN) +Z instead of Z to the holder in Step 5 of
Protocol 4 . As part of the RDE decryption the holder uses his PIN to calculate
Z ′−I(PIN) and uses this as ephemeral key Z. As Z is a random point so is Z ′,
implying that it holds no information on the PIN. We note that [7] specifies two
suitable mappings (generic and integrated). One can also consider the PIN as a
big integer and look for a point in 〈G〉 with that PIN as its x coordinate. If this
fails one add one to the PIN until such a point exists. In commonly used elliptic
curves two such points exists corresponding with a y coordinates that are even
and odd. By consistently choosing one such point one obtains a deterministic
mapping. Many variants of this construction exist. An RDE extraction PIN is
not a regular one in the sense that a passport does not lock after a number of
incorrect PINs are used by the holder. However, an RDE extraction PIN still
substantially reduces the risk related to loss of the passport by the legitimate
holder. Indeed, with possession of the passport and RDE encrypted data but
without the Extraction PIN a party would need to brute force the Extraction
PIN in interaction with the passport. That is, the RDE extraction PIN is bound
to the e-passport which is an important property. Each try takes about 1 second.
This implies for instance that the brute force approach has an expected run time
of more than 17 years for a 5 digit PIN from an alphabet of 64 characters. Indeed
as 645/(2 ∗ 3600 ∗ 24 ∗ 365) ≈ 17. Actually, it seems unlikely that a passport will
be be able to withstand so many operations without failure.
6 Conclusion
Based on the Chip Authentication protocol we have demonstrated Remote Doc-
ument Encryption (RDE) for e-passports, identity cards and electronic driver
licenses. This allows any party to encrypt data for an electronic document holder
such that only with possession of the document these can be decrypted. Possible
applications include additional protection of personal data stored in various types
of web applications and protection of local storage in mobile applications. Com-
bined with Remote Document Authentication [12] one can effectively transform
an e-passport into a complete PKI smartcard albeit not PIN protected in the
regular sense. To this end we have introduced the notion of Extraction PIN,
effectively providing the same security. We finally remark that RDE encrypted
data is lost when the document used is lost. This is particulary relevant as in
some countries old identity documents are taken as part of renewal.
7 Acknowledgement
We are indebted to Gert Maneschijn for posing the question on feasibility of
Remote Document Encryption on e-passports and its applications. We want to
thank Andreas Schwier for modifying the eID simulator script collection to let it
support AES-128 CA secure messaging. Finally we want to thank Alfred Velthuis
13
7. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
for initially pointing us to the possibilities of the Smart Card Shell and Smart
Card Shell Script Collection.
References
1. BSI, eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Technical Guideline TR-03110-1,
Version 2.20 26 February 2015.
2. BSI, Protocols for electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services (eI-
DAS), Technical Guideline TR-03110-2, Version 2.21 21 December 2016.
3. CardContact Systems, Smart Card Shell and Smart Card Shell Script Collection.
Available from www.openscdp.org.
4. European Commission, Laying down technical requirements with regard to driving
licences which include a storage medium (microchip), 4 May 2012.
5. ICAO, Doc 2303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, 2015.
Available from www.icao.int/.
6. ICAO, Doc 2303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, part 10:
Logical Data Structure (LDS) for Storage of Biometrics and Other Data in the
Contactless Integrated Circuit (IC), 2015. Available from www.icao.int/.
7. ICAO, Doc 2303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Seventh Edition, part 11:
security mechanims for MRTDs, 2015. Available from www.icao.int/.
8. ISO/IEC, 7816-4:2013, Identification cards Integrated circuit cards Part 4: Or-
ganization, security and commands for interchange, 2013.
9. ISO/IEC, 9796-2:2010 Information technology Security techniques Digital signa-
ture schemes giving message recovery Part 2: Integer factorization based mechan-
ism, 2010.
10. ISO/IEC, 9797-1:2011 Information technology Security techniques Message Au-
thentication Codes (MACs) Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher, 2011.
11. ISO/IEC, 18013, Information technology Personal identification ISO-compliant
driving licence. Four parts available from www.iso.org.
12. B. Jacobs et al., Beveiligingeisen ten aanzien van identificatie en authenticatie voor
toegang zorgconsument tot het Elektronisch Patintendossier (EPD), 2 December
2008. Available from www.cs.ru.nl/B.Jacobs/PAPERS/BLG18295.pdf
13. Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Introduction to Modern Cryptography, CRC
PRESS, 2008.
14. Bert Jaap Koops, Crypto Law Survey. See www.cryptolaw.org.
15. NIST, FIPS PUB 46-3, Data Encryption Standard (DES), 1999
16. NIST, FIPS PUB 180-4, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2015.
17. NIST, FIPS PUB 197, Specification for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES),
2001
18. NIST, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013.
19. NIST, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode
for Authentication and Confidentiality, SP 800-38C, May 2004.
20. NIST, Recommendation for Key Management, Part 1: General, Special Publication
800-57, 2016.
21. NIST, Recommendation for Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions, Spe-
cial Publication 800-108, 2009.
22. OASIS, (2005), Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML). See
www.oasis-open.org.
23. Oostdijk M., van Dijk DJ., Wegdam M., UserCentric Identity Using ePassports,
SecureComm 2009, LNICST, volume 19, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.
14
A. RDE EXPERIMENTS
A RDE experiments
We have tested Proposition 3.1 in practice using the Smart Card Shell and the
Smart Card Shell Script Collection [3]. For this we slightly modified the method
generateEphemeralCAKeyPair in the JavaScript “chipauthentication.js” in the
ICAO directory of the collection. The modified method copies the ephemeral
key pair (prkCA and pukCA) and reuses this in the next call of the method if
a variable mem is set to one. We also introduced a modification of the method
readEFwithSFI JavaScript “eac20.js”. The original method keeps reading the
elementary file using the READ BINARY command until an error is encountered.
This new method, read128EFwithSFI, only uses one READ BINARY command
reading (maximally) 128 bytes from the file typically without returning an error.
In our experiment we used the Smart Card Shell JavaScript code indicated below.
We think this script is self-explanatory but for further explanation we refer to
[3]. In the script we read data group 14 holding the CA key as suggested after
Protocol 3. The MRZ in the script below allows the script to work out-of-the
box with the e-passport simulator in the Smart Card Shell Script Collection.
load("eac20.js");
var mrz = "TPD<<T220001293<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<6408125<1010318D"+
"<<<<<<<<<<<<<6MUSTERMANN<<ERIKA<<<<<<<<<<<<<";
var card = new Card(_scsh3.reader);
card.reset(Card.RESET_COLD);
/* Round 1 */
card.reset(Card.RESET_COLD);
var crypto = new Crypto();
var eac = new EAC20(crypto, card);
eac.selectLDS();
eac.performBACWithMRZ(mrz);
eac.readDG14();
eac.readCVCA();
eac.performChipAuthentication();
eac.read128EFwithSFI(14);
/* Round 2 */
mem=1; /* reuses ephemeral key pair */
/* mem=0 generates new key pair */
card.reset(Card.RESET_COLD);
var crypto = new Crypto();
var eac = new EAC20(crypto, card);
eac.selectLDS();
eac.performBACWithMRZ(mrz);
eac.readDG14();
eac.readCVCA();
eac.performChipAuthentication();
eac.read128EFwithSFI(14);
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When this script is run in the Smart Card Shell it displays the shared key, the
secure messages and the decrypted messages. In Figure 3 we have depicted the
shared keys and secure responses of the final call eac.read128EFwithSFI(14) in
the script. Here the Smart Card Shell simulator was used to simulate an AES-
128 based e-passport. The left side depicts the two protected responses in the
regular situation (mem = 0): the shared keys and responses from rounds 1 and
2 are different. The right side corresponds with the RDE setting (mem = 1):
here the shared keys and protected responses (i.e. M from Proposition 3.1)
from rounds 1 and 2 coincide. This behaviour is in line with Proposition 3.1.
Similar experiments were done with a simulation of a 3DES based e-passport.
By changing the MRZ in the script we conducted an experiment on an AES-256
based Dutch passport (issued June 2015, CA based on Brainpool320r1/AES-
256). We also tested a Dutch identity card (issued July 2010, CA based on
Brainpool256r1/3DES). All experiments are consistent with Proposition 3.1.
Figure 3: RDE experiments
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